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OIL AND GAS-LEASES:
THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH DAKOTA HOLDS THAT A
LESSEE'S FAILURE TO RESPOND WITHIN TWENTY DAYS TO A
NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF A LEASE DOES NOT RESULT IN
AUTOMATIC TERMINATION OF INTEREST IN THE LEASE
Ridl v. EP OperatingLtd. Partnership
553 N.W.2d 784 (N.D. 1996)
I.

FACTS

On March 9, 1969, the Ridls granted an exclusive oil and gas lease
on their property in Stark County, North Dakota, to a predecessor of EP
Operating Limited Partnership (hereinafter EP).I The lease was granted
for a primary term of five years. 2 The lease also allowed for the continuation of the lease after the primary term. 3 On March 15, 1973, a portion of the leased land became part of a producing unit called the Dickinson Heath Sand Unit (hereinafter Dickinson Unit). 4 Anton A. Ridl and
Eleanor Ridl conferred another oil and gas lease on the same lands on
1. Ridl v. EP Operating Ltd. Partnership, 553 N.W.2d 784, 785-86 (N.D. 1996). The plaintiffs,
Anton J. Ridl, Sadako Ridl, Eugene K. Ridl, Clarence R. Ridl, June Ridl, Grace 1. Wetzel, Raymond A.
Ridl, and Regina A. Ridl, received their interests from Anton A. Ridl and Eleanor Ridl. Id. The 1969
lease was given by Anton A. Ridl, Eleanor M. Ridl, Anton J. Ridl, Sadako Ridl, Raymond A. Ridl, and
Regina A. Ridl. Id. at 786. The lease at issue is now owned by Enserch Exploration. Id. at 785 n.2.
2. Id. at 786. The primary term of an oil and gas lease is the time period in which the lessee has
the right, but not the obligation, to drill for oil and gas on the leased land. EUGENE 0. KuNrz ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS oNO ILAND G AS LAW 159 (2d ed. 1993). The property that was leased by the
Ridls is located at East 1/2, Southeast 1/4, and Northwest 1/4, Southeast 1/4 of section 23, and
Northwest 1/4 and South 1/2 (excluding 77.96 acres) of section 24, Township 140 North, Range 96
West in Stark County. Rid, 553 N.W.2d at 786.
3. Id. The granting clause asserted that the lease would be in effect after the initial five year
term by the following language:
'and as long thereafter as oil or gas or casinghead gas of either or any of them, is produced therefrom; or as much longer thereafter as the lessee in good faith shall conduct
drilling operations thereon and should production result from such operations, this lease
shall remain in full force and effect as long as oil and gas or casinghead gas, shall be
produced therefrom; or as much longer thereafter as the lessee in good faith shall conduct drilling operations thereon and should production result from such operations, this
lease shall remain in full force and effect as long as oil or gas or casinghead gas shall be
produced therefrom.'
Id. This clause is known as a "thereafter" clause. See Feland v. Placid Oil Co., 171 N.W.2d 829, 831
(N.D. 1969). This clause may extend the lease into a secondary term after the primary term has
expired. KuNTz ET AL., supra note 2. The secondary term is a period of time in which the lessee is
granted rights to develop the leasehold if production of oil and gas is obtained. Id.
4. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 786. The Southeast quarter of section 23 was included in the Dickinson
Unit. Id.
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December 20, 1973.5 This lease was also granted for a primary term of
five years and provided for a secondary term. 6 Unitization was allowed
by both the 1969 lease and the 1973 lease, and both leases stated that
unitized production would qualify as production under the lease. 7
In 1976, R. E. Moore wrote to EP on behalf of the Ridls, asking EP
to either drill a well on the leased land or release it.8 EP's reply to
Moore's letter was that the lease was held by production due to the
Dickinson Unit and, therefore, EP would not release the Ridls' lease. 9
Anton A. Ridl and Eleanor Ridl ratified the 1973 lease on April 15,
1981.10 EP's predecessor started drilling a well on the leased land on
May 12, 1981. 11 On June 2, 1981, EP's predecessor completed the well
as a dry hole.12
On May 15, 1995, the Ridls' attorney sent a letter to EP requesting
that EP release the 1973 lease with the exception of the portion that was
included in the Dickinson Unit.13 The Ridls' attorney included a partial
release for EP to sign and a notice of termination. 14 These documents
were drawn up pursuant to the requirements set out in Section 47-16-36
of the North Dakota Century Code, which deals with the termination and
5. Id. The land was leased again due to a mistake on the part of EP's predecessor, Lone Star
Producing Company [hereinafter Lone Star]. Brief of Appellee at 6, Ridl v. EP Operating Ltd.
Partnership, 553 N.W.2d 784 (ND 1996) (Civ. No. 960032). The lease was acquired by Lone Star
because the company mistakenly believed that the 1969 lease did not exist. Id. Also, Anton J. Ridl and
Eleanor Ridl received bonus payments for both of these leases. Id. at 8-9. The error was later
discovered when the company was examining the Ridls' file due to R. E. Moore's letter. See infra
notes 8-9 and accompanying text. Anton J. Ridl and Eleanor Ridl were asked to return $11,000, the
amount of the overpayment, but they did not do so. Brief of Appellee at 6, Ridl (Civ. No. 960032).
6. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 786. The granting clause stated that the lease could continue beyond the
primary term 'as long thereafter as oil, gas, distillate .
is produced hereunder, or any operation is
conducted, any payment is made, or any condition exists, which as hereinafter provided continues this
lease in force.' Id.
7. Id. at 786, 788 n.5. Unitization is defined as "[b]ringing together ... some of all of the well
spacing units over a producing reservoir for joint operations." 2 OWEN L. ANDERSON, NORTH DAKOTA
OIL AND GAS LAW AND LAND PRACTICE 473 (The Institute for Energy Development, Inc. 1983).
8. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 788. R. E. Moore is an "oilman" from Dickinson, North Dakota. Brief of
Appellant at 5, Ridl v. EP Operating Ltd. Partnership, 553 N.W.2d 784 (ND 19966) (Civ. No. 960032).
He is the president of an oil company and has been in the oil business for many years. Brief of
Appellee at 6, Ridl (Civ. No. 960032).
9. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 788. The letter also explained that the error was made in acquiring the
1973 lease. Brief of Appellant at 8, Ridl (Civ. No. 960032); Brief of Appellee at 9, 15, Ridl (Civ. No.
960032).
10. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 786.
If. Id. The well was drilled on the Southwest 1/4, Northwest 1/4 of section 24. Id.
12. Id. Other wells were drilled close to the Ridls' land at approximately the same time. Brief of
Appellee at 10, Ridl (Civ. No. 960032). These wells were also completed as dry holes. Id.
13. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 786. These documents were sent by certified mail. Brief of Appellant at
5, Ridl (Civ. No. 960032). They were received and signed for by EP Operating on May 31, 1995. Id.
14. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 786.
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forfeiture of leases. 15 The notice of termination stated that the lease was
"forfeited and void" if EP did not inform the county's Register of
Deeds within twenty days that the "lease ha[d] not been forfeited."16
The letter from the Ridls' attorney also demanded that EP sign and
record a release of the lease. 17 EP received the communication on May
31, 1995.18 EP's legal department received the mailing on June 15,
1995.19
Pursuant to Section 47-16-36, the Ridls recorded a Satisfaction of
Oil and Gas Lease with the Register of Deeds twenty days after their
attorney sent EP the demand letter, the notice of termination, and the
partial release. 2 0 At the same time, the Ridls also recorded a notice of
termination of the 1973 lease, excluding the Dickinson Unit. 2 1 The next
day, EP sent a letter to the Ridls' attorney and the Register of Deeds
stating that the lease had not been forfeited and was still "in full force
and effect." 22 Additionally, on July 5, 1995, EP recorded a notice of oil
and gas lease stating that the lease remained "in full force and effect"
and asserting that the lease had been held by continuous production
from the Dickinson Unit. 23
The Ridls then brought an action against EP for cancellation of the
1973 lease on the grounds that EP had not responded in a timely manner to the notice of termination or breach of the implied covenant of
reasonable development. 2 4 EP counterclaimed and both parties filed
15. Brief of Appellant at 5, Ridl (Civ. No. 960032) (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-36 (Supp.
1998)).
16. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 786. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-36 (Supp. 1997)).
17. Id.
18. Id. The mailing was delayed because it was sent to Enserch Corporation, the parent company of EP. Brief of Appellee at 11, Ridl (Civ. No. 960032). The communication was then forwarded
to the offices of Enserch Exploration, Incorporated [hereinafter Enserch] which was at another address in the same city. Id. Enserch's Division Order Department received it on June 2, 1995. Id. The
correspondence was then routed to Enserch's Lease Administration Department on approximately
June 14, 1995. Id. Next, it was forwarded to Enserch's Mid-Continent Exploration Region, which
received the mailing on June 14, 1995. Id. That same day, the correspondence was given to
Enserch's Land Development Group. Id. Finally, it was routed to Enserch's Legal Department and
received on June 15, 1995. Id.
19. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 786.
20. Id. The Satisfaction of Oil and Gas Lease was recorded June 15, 1995. Id. The Satisfaction
indicated that the lease, with the exclusion of the Dickinson Unit portion, had been forfeited. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. These notices were not within the 20 day statutory period and thus could not be recorded.
See Brief of Appellant at 6, Ridl (Civ. No. 960032).
23. Ridl, 553 N.w.2d at 786.
24. Id. The suit was commenced by a complaint dated August 8, 1995. Brief of Appellant at 6,
Rid! (Cir. No. 960032).
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motions for summary judgment. 25 EP's motion for summary judgment
was granted. 26 Additionally, the district court upheld EP's lease and
dissolved the satisfaction of the lease that had been recorded at the Stark
County Register of Deeds. 2 7 The Ridls appealed from the district court's
judgment. 2 8 In a four-to-one decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court
held that EP's interest in the lease was not terminated when it neglected
to reply within twenty days of the Ridls' notice of termination. The
court also determined that termination of a lease requires a suitable
demand and a failure to further develop within a reasonable time. 29
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

In April of 1951, oil was discovered in Williams County, North
Dakota. 3 0 Two years prior to this discovery, the North Dakota Supreme
Court decided a forfeiture case that foreshadowed Section 47-16-36 of
the North Dakota Century Code.3l In this pre-statute case, the court
noted that the breach of an implied covenant by a lessee could be
grounds for a lessor to apply to a court of equity for forfeiture of the
lease in question. 32 However, the court cautioned that just because a
lease can be forfeited due to the breach of an implied covenant, lessors
should not "arbitrarily treat the lease as terminated" before providing
the lessee with notice of the breach and "without taking legal proceed25. Id. EP counterclaimed for damages resulting from slander of title. Appendix of Appellee at
8, Ridl (Civ. No. 960032). Also, in its counterclaim, EP demanded that its title be quieted. Brief of
Appellee at 11, Ridl (Civ. No. 960032). In addition, EP demanded attorney's fees, costs, and
disbursements incurred due to the Ridls' claim. Id.
26. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at786.
27. Id. at 786-87. The district court also stated that there had been no issue present as to the 1969
lease in that suit. Id. at 787.
28. Brief of Appellants at 3, Ridl (Civ. No. 960032).
29. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 785-86. The final issue alleged by the Ridls, whether the 1973 lease required production in paying quantities, was not decided by the court. Id. Since the court upheld
summary judgment for EP, the issue was not relevant to this case. Id.
30. 2 ANDERSON, supra note 7, at 29.

31. Herman Hanson Oil Syndicate v. Bentz, 40 N.W.2d 304, 307-08 (N.D. 1949).
32. Id. at 308. Herman Hanson Oil Syndicate was the first case in which the North Dakota
Supreme Court recognized the existence of implied covenants in an oil and gas lease. Id. An implied
covenant is a duty stemming from the intent of the parties, which is placed on the lessee by courts.
HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & C HARLES J. M EYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND G As TERMS 512 (9th ed. 1994). An
implied covenant in an oil and gas lease "aris[es] by implication from the lease" and confers obligations on the lessee in addition to the lessee's express duties under the lease. ANDERSON, supra note 7,at
29. The following are implied covenants that have been recognized by various jurisdictions: The offset well covenant, the covenant to test, the reasonable development covenant, the further exploration
covenant, the marketing and production covenant, and the careful operations covenant. Id.
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ings to effect such termination." 33 In addition to the notice requirement, the court held that before cancellation will be granted, the lessor
must have made a proper demand upon the lessee and given the lessee a
reasonable amount of time to comply with the covenant. 34
Section 47-16-36 of the North Dakota Century Code was enacted
by the Legislature in 1951, and seems to contradict the idea that a breach
of an implied covenant is determined by the court. 35 In its current form,
33. Herman Hanson Oil Syndicate, 40 N.W.2d at 308. The Herman court reasoned that implied
covenants should be acknowledged since they are necessary to advance the primary goal of the lease,
which is to encourage the lessee to diligently pursue drilling operations. Id. The court further
reasoned that without implying covenants, lessors would be helpless against lessees who fail to diligently develop the leased premises. Id. at 309. However, a lessor can protect himself by inserting express
clauses into the lease. Id. at 307.
34. Id. at 308-09. The court stated that a court of equity can cancel a lease due to the lessee's
failure to proceed with drilling operations with "reasonable diligence" where it appears that forfeiture
would be equitable under the facts of the case. Id. at 308; see Feland v. Placid Oil Co., 171 N.W.2d
829, 835 (N.D. 1969) (affirming the rule that a lessor must demand that the lessee fulfill the obligations
of the covenant before a cancellation of a lease because of a breach of the implied covenant to
develop).
35. S.B. 85, 32d Leg., (N.D. 1951). The following is the text of Section 47-16-36 in its present
form:
47-16-36. Duty of lessee to have terminated or forfeited lease released-Publication
notice-Satisfaction of lease to be recorded-Notice to real property owner-Remedies.
When any oil, gas, or other mineral lease heretofore or hereafter given on real property
situated in any county of North Dakota and recorded therein shall terminate or become
forfeited, it shall be the duty of the lessee, his successors or assigns, within fifteen days
after the date of the termination or forfeiture of any such lease, to have such lease
surrendered in writing, such surrender to be signed by the party making the same,
acknowledged, and placed on record in the county where the leased property is situated
vithout cost to the owner thereof. If the said lessee, his successors or assigns, shall fail
or neglect to execute and record such surrender within the time provided for, then the
owner of said real property may serve upon said lessee, his successors or assigns of
record, in person or by registered or certified mail, at his last known address, or if the
post-office address is not shown of record then by publication once a week for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the real
property is situated, a notice in writing in substantially the following form:
To
: I, the undersigned, owner of the following described land
situated in __
County, North Dakota, to wit: (description of land) upon
which a lease dated __

day of __

19 - , was given to _

do

hereby elect to notify you that such lease has terminated or become
forfeited by breach of the terms thereof, that I hereby declare and do
declare the said lease forfeited and void and that,' unless you do, within
twenty days from this date, notify the register of deeds of said county as
provided by law that said lease has not been forfeited, I will file with the
said register of deeds a satisfaction of lease as provided by law, and I
hereby demand that you execute or have executed a proper surrender of
said lease and that you put the same of record in the office of the register
of deeds of said county within twenty days from this date.
[lines for date and signature omitted)
The owner of said real property may after twenty days from the date of service, registration, or first publication of said notice, file with the register of deeds of the county where
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Section 47-16-36 provides that a mineral owner may serve a notice of
termination upon the lessee by either registered or certified mail at the
lessee's last known address, or by publication. 36 The statute sets forth
that the lessee, or its successors or assigns, shall within twenty days file a
notice in writing with the register of deeds that the lease has not been
forfeited. 37 Under the statute, if the lessee does not meet the twenty day
deadline, the lease can be terminated of record. 38
The North Dakota Supreme Court did not have occasion to interpret
Section 47-16-36 of the North Dakota Century Code until 1978.39 The
foundation for this case came from a 1951 Kansas case interpreting a
similar law. 4 0 In Christiansen v. Virginia Drilling Co., 4 1 the lessor
said real property is situated a satisfaction of lease setting forth that the affiant is the
owner of said real property, that the lease has terminated or that the lessee, or his successors or assigns, has failed and neglected to comply with the terms of said lease, reciting
the facts constituting such failure and that the same has been forfeited and is void, and
setting out in said satisfaction of lease a copy of the notice served, as above provided and
the manner and time of the service thereof. If the lessee, his successors or assigns, shall
within such twenty days after service, give notice in writing to the register of deeds of
the county where said real property is located that said lease has not been forfeited and
that said lessee, his successors or assigns, still claim that said lease is in full force and
effect, then the said satisfaction of lease shall not be recorded but the register of deeds
shall notify the owner of the real property of the action of the lessee, his successors or
assigns, and the owner of the real property shall be entitled to the remedies now provided
by law for the cancellation of such disputed lease. If the lessee, his successors or
assigns, shall not notify the register of deeds, as above provided, then the register of
deeds shall record said satisfaction of the lease and thereafter the record of the lease
shall not be notice to the public of the existence of said lease or any interest therein, or
rights thereunder, and said record shall not be received in evidence in any court of the
state on behalf of the lessee, his successors or assigns, against the lessor, his successors
or assigns.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-36 (Supp. 1997).
36. Id.; see supra note 35 for the text of the statute. Section 47-16-36 has been amended many
times since its enactment. In 1953, the statute was amended to reduce the time in which the lessee was
allotted to respond to a notice of.termination. S.B. 91, 33rd Leg. (N.D. 1953). The time period in
which a lessee was to surrender a forfeited lease changed from 60 days to 15 days. Id. In addition,
the amendment also reduced the time in which a lessee had to notify the register of deeds after
receiving a notice of termination that the lease was still valid by changing the time frame from 30 days
to 20 days. Id. In 1955, the statute was amended and reenacted, but the actual text was not altered.
S.B. 100, 34th Leg. (N.D. 1955). Section 47-16-36 of the North Dakota Century Code was also
amended in 1977 to add the provision that a satisfaction of lease could be filed by the lessor if the
lessee failed to reply to the notice of termination within 20 days. S.B. 2276, 45th Leg. (N.D. 1977).
The term "satisfaction of lease" replaced the word "affidavit" in the text of the statue. Id. I n
addition, the statute was amended in 1981 to alter the provision for notice of termination by
publication. S.B. 2226, 47th Leg. (N.D. 1981). The interval of publication ("once a week") was
added to the rule. Id.
37. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-36 (Supp. 1997).
38. Id.
39. Taurus Corp. v. Roman York Equity Pure Trust, 264 N.W.2d 688, 690 (N.D. 1978).
40. Id. (citing Christiansen v. Virginia Drilling Co., 226 P.2d 263, 268 (1951)); see infra note 52
for a comparison of the two statutes.
41. 226 P.2d 263, 268 (1951).
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brought legal action alleging the cancellation of a lease due to the lessee's breach of an implied covenant. 4 2 The Supreme Court of Kansas
held that there cannot be a cancellation for a breach of an implied
43
covenant unless there has been a judicial determination to that effect.
The court in Christiansenreasoned that the provision that governed the
situation was a forfeiture statute and, as such, should be "strictly construed in favor of the person whose property is sought to be forfeited." 4 4 The Christiansen court also noted that the statute was not
meant to be used as a way in which a lessor could, at the lessor's discretion, forfeit a portion of the lease or the entire lease due to a violation of
45
an implied covenant.
The dissenting opinion in Christiansen disagreed with the majority's holding that the only way a breach of an implied covenant is determined by a judicial decision. 4 6 The dissenting opinion argued that the
statute was designed to provide an inexpensive tool for lessors to clear a
cloud on their title against a lease believed to be forfeited. 47 Under the
dissent's interpretation, the statute should result in an automatic forfeiture of a lessee's interest in a lease regardless of whether the validity
of the lease is in dispute. 4 8 The dissent reasoned that forfeiture under
the statute is not automatic because the lessor must strictly adhere to the
guidelines set forth in the statute. 49 The dissent further declared that,
after the statutory procedure has been followed, the lessee may seek a
judicial determination to see whether the lease actually has been
forfeited.50
In 1978, the North Dakota Supreme Court had its first opportunity
to interpret Section 47-16-36 in the case of Taurus Corp. v. Roman York
Equity Pure Trust.51 In Taurus, a lessor instituted forfeiture proceedings
under Section 47-16-36 of the North Dakota Century Code because the
lessee had allegedly neglected to pay consideration on the lease. 52 The
42. Christiansen v. Virginia Drilling Co., 226 P.2d 263, 268 (1951).
43. Id.
44. Id. (citing and interpreting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-201 (1994)). The property that was "sought
to be forfeited" in this case was the lessee's interest in the lease. Christiansen, 226 P.2d at 268.
45. Id. (interpreting what is now KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-201).
46. Id. at 269 (Wedell, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 269-70.
49. Id. at 269.
50. Id.
51. 264 N.W.2d 688, 690 (N.D. 1978).
52. Taurus Corp. v. Roman Equity Pure Trust, 264 N.W.2d 688, 690 (N.D. 1978). The statute at
issue in Christiansenwas identical to the version of Section 47-16-36 that was involved in Taurus, with
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Taurus court declined to adopt the majority's opinion in Christiansen
and instead adopted the reasoning of the dissent, holding that the statute
provides a method by which recorded oil, gas, and other mineral leases
could be removed by the lessor. 53 The court further held that a lessee
loses interest in a lease if the lessee neglects to reply to a notice of
termination within the twenty day statutory period. 54 The court stated
that if a lessee contests the termination or forfeiture under Section
47-16-36, the lessee can require the lessor to obtain a judicial determination of the matter by presenting notice to the register of deeds within the
required time. 5 5 However, the Taurus court stated that a trial court need
56
not examine the purpose of the termination.
The impact of Taurus became evident in the 1983 case of Nygaard
v. Robinson.5 7 In Nygaard, the lessor sought forfeiture of an oil and gas
the exception of a few provisions. First, the North Dakota statute states that the lessee has 15 days in
which to release a lease that has become forfeited before a lessor can utilize the procedure set forth
in the statute. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-36 (Supp. 1997). The Kansas statute, on the other hand, gives
the lessee 60 days to surrender the lease before the statutory procedure can be implemented by the
lessor. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-201 (1994). Also, North Dakota's statute provides that a satisfaction of
lease can be filed when the lessee fails to reply to a notice of termination within the statutory time
frame. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-36. The Kansas statute, however, states that an "affidavit of
forfeiture" can be filed by the lessor when the lessee neglects to respond within the statutory time
period. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-201. Additionally, the North Dakota statute does not provide the lessee
as much time as the Kansas statute, in which the lessee has to respond to a notice of termination. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 47-16-36; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-201. The North Dakota statute specifies that a lessee is
allowed 20 days to respond to a notice of termination before a lessor is permitted to record a
satisfaction of lease, while the Kansas statute entitles a lessee to 30 days in which to reply to a notice
of termination prior to the recording of an affidavit of forfeiture. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-36; KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 55-201.
53. Taurus Corp., 264 N.W.2d at 688, 692-93 (citing Christiansen,226 P.2d at 268-69). The
Taurus court stated that it could distinguish this case from Christiansenbecause of the differences in
the statutes involved and because Taurus was not dealing with a breach of the implied covenant to
develop. Id. (citing Christiansen, 226 P.2d at 268-69). Nonetheless, the Taurus court said that it was
"unnecessary . . . to distinguish the case before [it] from Christiansen" because it "[found] the
reasoning of the dissenting judges more convincing than that of the majority." Id.
54. Id. at 692-93. But cf. Christiansen,226 P.2d at 268 (interpreting what is now KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 55-201 (1994)). Furthermore, the Taurus court impliedly rejected the long-standing rule that a lease
cannot be terminated unless there has been notice and a judicial determination to that effect. See
Taurus Corp., 264 N.W.2d at 693; Herman Hanson Oil Syndicate v. Bentz, 40 N.W.2d 304, 308 (N.D.
1949).
55. Taurus Corp., 264 N.W.2d at 693. The notice presented to the register of deeds must be in
writing and must state that the lease has not. been forfeited but continues to be in "full force and
effect." N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-36 (Supp. 1997). If no such notice is received by the register of
deeds within 20 days, the lessor can record a satisfaction of lease stating that the lease has been
forfeited. Id.
56. Taurus Corp., 264 N.W.2d at 690. The concurring opinion stated that the statute produces
injustice because it establishes a "trap for the unwary." Id. at 693 (Pederson, J., concurring).
Nevertheless, the concurring justice felt that it was the task of the Legislature to cure this situation
instead of the courts. Id.
57. 341 N.W.2d 349, 358 n.2 (N.D. 1983).
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lease due to a failure of consideration. 58 The North Dakota Supreme
Court followed Taurus and held that Section 47-16-36 detailed a process
by which a lessor could cancel a lease without a judicial determination. 5 9
Three years later in Johnson v. Hamill,60 lessors sought to cancel a
lease for expiration of its primary term by following the procedure set
forth in Section 47-16-36.61 The lessors in this case were seeking a judicial declaration to cancel the lease on the grounds that the lessee had
breached the implied covenant of reasonable development, the implied
covenant of exploration, or both.62 The North Dakota Supreme Court
58. Nygaard v. Robinson, 341 N.w.2d 349, 353 (N.D. 1983). The lessee in this case, in addition
to disputing the cancellation of the lease, challenged the counterpart of § 47-16-36, which provides
that a lessor may recover costs and attorney's fees incurred in seeking a judicial termination of a
lease. Id. at 357-58. The lessee argued that § 47-16-37 of the North Dakota Century Code was
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause because it allowed recovery of costs and attorneys
fees to lessors bringing an action under § 47-16-36, but not to lessees. Id. at 357. The Nygaard court
held that the statute did not violate either the North Dakota Constitution or the United States
Constitution because, although the statute did create a classification, the classification "is not
arbitrary." Id. at 360. In upholding the statute, the court also stated that there appeared to be plausible
reasons why the Legislature would choose to favor the lessor. Id. at 359. After considering the
"simple procedure outlined in [s]ection 47-16-36 for clearing land titles," the court reasoned that the
Legislature enacted § 47-16-37 as a "motivation for a lessee to release a lease on lands containing oil,
gas, or other minerals." Id. Additionally, the court pointed out that the Legislature might have enacted
§ 47-16-37 to "equalize the bargaining power of lessors and lessees." Id.
59. Id. at 351; see also Nantt v. Puckett Energy Co., 382 N.w.2d 655, 658 (N.D. 1986) (interpreting North Dakota Century Code § 47-16-36 in keeping with Taurus); (Norman Jessen & Assoc. v.
Amoco Prod. Co., 305 N.w.2d 648, 649-50 (N.D. 1981)) (adjudicating the validity of a lease, due to
an action by the lessor for cancellation of the lease, necessitated by lessee's response within the
statutory time limit to the lessor's notice of termination).
60. 392 N.W.2d 55 (N.D. 1986).
61. Johnson v. Hamill, 392 N.W.2d 55, 56 (N.D. 1986). In the alternative, the lessors sought an
order requiring the lessee to drill a well on the leased premises. Id.
62. Id. In 1969, the North Dakota Supreme Court specifically recognized the existence of the implied covenant of reasonable development in the case of Feland v. Placid Oil Company, 171 N.W.2d
829, 835 (N.D. 1969). The implied covenant of reasonable development is the duty of the lessee to
reasonably develop the land after the drilling of an initial well. ANDERSON, supra note 7, at 29. The
aim of the covenant of reasonable development is to ensure that all of the recoverable oil and gas
underlying the leased land is obtained and that a reasonable amount of production is maintained.
PHiLLiP G. D UFFORD ET AL., OIL AND GAS FOR THE L ANDOWNERS LAWYER 87 (1979). Furthermore, the

Feland court expounded upon the idea of implied covenants by introducing a test to ascertain whether
a lessee has breached an implied covenant. 171 N.W.2d at 835. Specifically, the court held that a lessee has an implied duty to act as a reasonable and prudent operator in the operation and development
of the leased land in the absence of an express clause excusing the lessee from doing so. Id.
To determine whether a lessee has met the "prudent operator" standard, the court reasoned that
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the alleged breach must be considered. Id. In 1984, the
court attempted to refine the prudent operator standard. See Olson v. Schwartz, 345 N.W.2d 33,
39-40 (N.D. 1984). The court began its analysis by reiterating that each case must be adjudged based
on its particular facts. Id. at 39. Next, the court claimed that it was not possible to devise a standard
formula to decide whether a lessee has sufficiently met the "prudent operator" standard.
Nevertheless, the court enumerated some factors to be examined. Id. at 39-40. Some of the factors
the court suggested to use in the prudent operator analysis are: I) investigating the quantity of oil and
gas that could be produced as shown by prior exploration and development; 2) studying market
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measured the lessee's actions by the "prudent operator" standard to
conclude that the lessee had not breached either of the implied covenants. 6 3 Consequently, the court held that the lease was still valid. 6 4
Thus, prior to Ridl, Section 47-16-36 had been interpreted by the
court to produce automatic forfeiture, without the need for judicial determination, of a lessee's interest in a lease when a lessee does not respond
to a notice of termination within twenty days. 65 However, the court had
conditions; 3) inspecting the nature of the current operations on nearby tracts; 4) analyzing the natural
reservoir; 5) calculating the costs associated with drilling and transportation; and 6) examining the
current market situation. Id. (citing Sanders v. Birmingham, 522 P.2d 959, 966 (Kan. 1974)). The
court also looked at whether a different operator would like to drill on the land. Id. at 40 (citing Berry
v. Wondra, 246 P.2d 282, 289 (Kan. 1952)). Further, the court stated that the willingness of the operator to develop the premises should be taken into consideration. Id. (citing McMahan v. Boggess, 302
S.W.2d 592, 594 (Ky. 1957)). Finally, the court pointed out that the time that has passed since drilling
operations last took place should be examined. Id. (citing Texas Consol. Oils v. Vann, 258 P.2d 679,
680 (Okla. 1953)).
The Olson court also acknowledged and possibly adopted another implied covenant, the covenant
of further exploration. 5 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS ET AL., WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW § 845,
at 334 (1996). The covenant of further exploration requires the lessor to explore undeveloped portions of leased land. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 32, at 513. Even though the court used the term
"implied covenant of reasonable development," it appeared to be speaking in terms of the covenant of
further exploration because the lessors brought suit against the lessee for failure to develop the unexplored parts of their land. Olson, 345 N.W.2d at 39. The covenant of further exploration resembles
the covenant of reasonable development because it also brings about a duty upon the lessee after
initial development has occurred. Robert L. Ver Schure, Another Look at the Implied Covenants,
TwENTY-StxTH ANNUAL ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW INSTITUTE 902 (1980). In contrast, the covenant of reasonable development mandates that a lessor develop previously discovered mineral deposits. Dufford, supra, at 88. Although it appeared that the court in Olson was impliedly recognizing
the covenant of further exploration, its existence in North Dakota was still uncertain. Olson, 345
N.W.2d at 39.
In Johnson v. Hamill, the court once again used the concepts of "development" and "exploration" interchangeably. 392 N.W.2d 55, 57 (N.D. 1986). The court did note that there is a covenant
of exploration but concluded that the facts of the case "deem[ed] it unnecessary to determine whether
or not [it] should adopt a separate covenant of further exploration." Id. at 57 n.1. In a minority of
jurisdictions including Texas, courts have found that the covenant of further exploration is not a
separate covenant but is instead part of the implied covenant of reasonable development. Clifton v.
Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 696 (Tex. 1959); see also Sun Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 783
S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex. 1989) (reaffirming the rule that an implied covenant to explore does not exist
independent of the covenant of reasonable development).
63. Johnson, 392 N.W.2d at 61.
64. Id.
65. Taurus Corp., 264 N.W.2d at 692-93; see also Letter from Michael J. Maus, Attorney at
Howe, Hardy, Galloway & Maus, Inc., Dickinson, N.D. (Oct. 17, 1997) (on file with author) (stating
that Section 47-16-36 "had been used for many years to remove from the record oil and gas leases
without a judicial determination"). Accordingly, before Ridl, the breach of an implied covenant of
reasonable development could result in termination of a lease. Herman Hanson Oil Syndicate v.
Bentz, 40 N.W.2d 304, 307-08 (N.D. 1949). However, this remedy was only available to a lessor who
had given the lessee satisfactory notice of the breach, demanded that the covenant be complied with,
and granted a reasonable time for compliance to the lessee. Id. If the validity of the lease was
adjudicated, the "prudent operator" standard was utilized to decide whether the lessee has complied
with the covenant. Feland, 171 N.W.2d at 835.
In 1990, the court again dealt with the implied covenant of reasonable development in Slaaten v.
Amerada Hess Corporation. 459 N.W.2d 765, 766 (N.D. 1990). The court used the "prudent
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only examined the statute's application in certain contexts. 66 Consequently, there was little information with which to predict how the court
would apply the statute to a breach of an implied covenant of reasonable
development.
III. ANALYSIS
The Ridl majority, in an opinion written by Justice Sandstrom,
began by interpreting Section 47-16-36 of the North Dakota Century
Code to determine whether EP's interest in the 1973 lease terminated
because it neglected to reply within twenty days of the Ridl's notice of
termination. 67 The court interpreted Section 47-16-36 to mean that if a
lessee fails to notify the Register of Deeds within twenty days that the
lease has not been forfeited and the lessee's interest in the lease is not
lost. Rather, the lessee merely loses record evidence. 68 Since the court
held that a lessee does not lose interest in the lease when it fails to reply
to a notice of termination, the court interpreted the statute as not
affecting the rights between the lessor and lessee, but only their rights as
to third parties. 6 9
Arguably, this was a great departure from the Taurus court's earlier
interpretation of Section 47-16-36, that if a lessee does not respond within the statutory time frame, the lease is automatically terminated and all
of the interest a lessee had in the lease is lost. 70 In Taurus, the court held
that Section 47-16-36 provides a method by which recorded oil, gas and
other mineral leases could be terminated by the lessor. 7 1 The Taurus
court further held that a lessee loses interest in a lease if the lessee
neglects to reply to a notice of termination within twenty days. 7 2 Even
though the Ridl decision appears to be a significant deviation from the
operator" factors set forth in Olson to conclude that the lessee had fulfilled the covenant of reasonable
development. Id. at 769 (citing Olson, 345 N.W.2d at 38-40). Though the lessor allegedly breached
the "implied covenant of reasonable development and further exploration," the court neglected to
address what status, if any, the covenant of further exploration has in North Dakota. Id. at 766.
66. See Taurus Corp., 264 N.W.2d at 693.
67. Ridl v. EP Operating Ltd. Partnership, 553 N.W.2d 784, 787 (N.D. 1996). The majority
opinion was written by Justice Sandstrom and was joined by Chief Justice VandeWalle and Justices
Neumann and Mating. Id. at 785, 789.
68. Id. at 787. A loss of record evidence means that the lease does not exist on the record.
Norman Jessen & Assoc. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 305 N.W.2d 648, 649 (N.D. 1981).
69. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 787; see N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-36 (Supp. 1997) (stating that if a
lessee does not inform the register of deeds within 20 days that the lease is still valid, the lessee can
record a satisfaction of lease, after which the record of the lease will not be notice to the public of the
existence of the lease nor can the lease be admitted into a court proceeding by a lessee).
70. See Taurus Corp., 264 N.W.2d at 689.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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holding of Taurus, the court did not expressly overrule Taurus.7 3
Rather, the court stated that it "decline[d] to extend [Taurus] to cases
involving alleged breaches of implied covenants." 74
The Ridl court's primary reason for departing from the Taurus
75
holding stems from the principle that the law despises forfeiture.
"[F]orfeiture statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the person
whose property is sought to be forfeited" if the statute is vague or
ambiguous. 7 6 Based on this premise, the court reasoned that Section
47-16-36 was not meant to create a trap for unguarded lessees whose
property interests could be automatically forfeited. 7 7 Thus, the court
construed Section 47-16-36 simply as a guideline that should be followed by the lessor before the validity of a lease is adjudicated. 78
Another reason the Ridl court stated for rejecting Taurus was to

avoid rendering Section 47-16-37 of the North Dakota Century Code
superfluous. 79 Section 47-16-37 provides the lessor with the right to
73. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 787-88. Ridl was also a shift from the Taurus court's interpretation that
the statute did concern the rights between the lessor and lessee. Taurus Corp., 264 N.W.2d at 689
(holding that a lessee's interest in a lease is lost if the lessee does not answer a notice of termination
within 20 days).
74. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 788; see Brief of Appellee at 26-27, Ridl (Civ. No. 960032) (claiming
that Taurus was correctly decided but distinguishing it from Ridl because Taurus involved lack of
consideration and not a breach of an implied covenant).
75. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 788 (citing Johnson v. Gray, 265 N.W.2d 861, 864 (N.D. 1978)).
76. Id. (citing Nelson v. TMH, Inc., 292 N.W.2d 580, 584 (N.D. 1980)) (stating that "equity abhors forfeiture"); see also Brief of Appellee at 35-36, Ridl (No. 960032) (discussing that strict application of the statute to the lease in question is unconstitutional since it provided the lessee with only six
to eight days to answer the notice of termination after allowing for mailing, thus depriving the lessee of
due process of law). In Taurus, the court held that § 47-16-36 is constitutional, even though the statute
does not afford the lessee extra days to respond to a notice served by mail, because due process does
not require that the lessee have 20 days after being served in which to respond. 264 N.W.2d at 692.
Even so, the court expressly noted that it was not holding that there could never be an unconstitutional
application of the statute. Id. But see Brief of Appellant at 9, Ridl (Civ. No. 960032) (arguing that the
statute is constitutional as applied in Ridl because of the court's decision in Taurus).
77. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 787-88. EP argued that North Dakota Century Code § 47-16-39.1 also
supports the idea that the Legislature did not intend for oil and gas statutes to result in automatic
forfeiture. Brief of Appellee at 25, Ridl (Civ. No. 960032). Section 47-16-39.1 states that payments of
royalties are the core of a lease, and a lessee's breach of the obligation to pay royalties "may" be
grounds for cancellation of the lease. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-39.1 (1987 & Supp. 1997).
Nevertheless, the statute mandates that even when a lessee fails to make royalty payments,
cancellation of the lease can only be made by the judiciary. Brief of Appellee at 25, Ridl (Civ. No.
960032).
78. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 787. The court held that loss of record evidence is "[t]he only consequence" provided by Section 47-16-36 when a lessee fails to respond within the statutory time limit;
automatic forfeiture is not included in the statute as a result for failing to respond in a timely manner.
Id.
79. Id. The following is the text of Section 47-16-37:
47-16-37. Action to obtain release-Damages, costs, and attorney's fees-Attachment.-Should the owner of such lease neglect or refuse to execute a release, then the
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acquire a lessee's interest by bringing legal action when a lessee fails to
execute a release. 80 The court reasoned that interpreting Section
47-16-36 to mean that a lease would be automatically terminated upon a
lessee's failure to respond within the twenty day time limit would make
the procedure outlined in Section 47-16-37 useless. 8 1 Thus, the court
decided that Section 47-16-36 must be construed as establishing a
preliminary method by which a lessor can institute forfeiture proceedings; with Section 47-16-37 giving the lessor the right to sue the lessee
for release upon failure of the lessee to execute the release and to
recover the costs incurred in doing so. 82
Overall, the Ridl court appeared to balance two principles in interpreting Section 47-16-36.83 First, the court recognized that the statute
serves as a form of protection for landowners. 84 Second, the court
sought to protect lessees by examining whether forfeiture would be too
harsh a result for noncompliance with the statute. 85 Ultimately, the
owner of the leased premises may sue in any court of competent jurisdiction to obtain
such release, and he may also recover in such action of the lessee, his successors or
assigns, the sum of one hundred dollars as damages, and all costs, together with a
reasonable attorney's fee for preparing and prosecuting the suit, and he may also
recover any additional damages that the evidence in the case will warrant. In all such
actions, writs of attachment may issue as in all other cases.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-37 (Supp. 1997).
80. Id.
81. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 787. The court stated that a statute must be interpreted to acknowledge
all of its terms "so that no part of the statute is inoperative or superfluous." Id. (quoting Trinity Med.
Ctr., Inc. v. Holum, 544 N.W.2d 148, 157 (N.D. 1996)). The court reasoned that a statute must be
read to have a purpose "because the law neither does nor requires idle acts." Id. (quoting State ex
rel. Kusler v. Sinner, 491 N.w.2d 382, 385 (N.D. 1992)).
82. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-16-36 to -37 (Supp. 1997)); see supra note 58 (discussing
that the court in Nygaard held that Section 47-16-36 set forth an uncomplicated process to be followed
for clearing a title and that Section 47-16-37 served as an incentive for a lessee to release a lease
when its validity is challenged).
83. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 787-88.
84. Id. The Ridls were only receiving $1.00 each per month in royalties from the leased lands;
this royalty was from the production of the Dickinson Unit. Brief of Appellant at 8, Ridl (Civ. No.
960032). This situation can be prevented by the insertion of a "Pugh clause" in a lease. See Olson v.
Schwartz, 345 N.W.2d 33, 41 n.3 (N.D. 1984). A Pugh clause usually contains the following
language:
this lease shall terminate at the end of the primary term as to all of the leased land except
those within a production or spacing unit .. .on which is located a well producing or
capable of producing oil and gas or on which lessee is engaged in drilling or reworking
operations.
Id. Further, Section 38-08-09.8 of the North Dakota Century Code provides that leased land outside of
a unit can be considered to be held by production resulting from the unit for only two years after part
of the land has been unitized. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-09.8 (1987 & Supp. 1997). However, the
Ridls did not have a Pugh clause in their lease. Brief of Appellee at 24, Ridl (No. 960032). Additionally, Section 38-08-09.8 of the North Dakota Century Code was passed after the Ridls had executed
their lease with EP's predecessor. Id.
85. Ridl, 553 N.w.2d at 787-88.
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court's abhorrence of forfeiture proved to be the stronger interest for its
interpretation of Section 47-16-36.86 Consequently, the court interpreted the statute to be only a guideline for a lessor to follow, not a method a
lessor could use to automatically forfeit a lease. 87
In addition to interpreting Section 47-16-36, the Ridl court reaffirmed the rule that before forfeiture for a breach of the implied
covenant of reasonable development will be granted, the lessor must first
give notice of the breach and demand that those terms be met within a
reasonable amount of time. 88 In this case, the court ruled that the Ridls
had not given proper notice or demand to EP.89
The Ridls asserted several instances in which they claimed they had
given EP proper notice of its breach of the covenant of reasonable development and demanded that EP comply with the covenant. 90 First, the
Ridls argued that a demand for further development was made by R. E.
Moore's letter of 1976 in which he asked EP either to drill on the leased
land or release it.91 However, the court reasoned that this demand was
86. Id. The court reasoned that its decision still protects the lessor since a lessor is still able to sue
to obtain a release of lands that are not being produced. Id. at 787.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 789. The court stated that proper notice and demand is necessary to encourage parties
to develop the premises. Id. at 788. In addition to reiterating the demand and reasonable time for
compliance requirements, the court reaffirmed that the issue of whether there has been reasonable
development is determined by the "prudent operator" standard. Id.; see Johnson v. Hamill, 392
N.W.2d 55, 58 (N.D. 1986); Olson v. Schwartz, 345 N.W.2d 33, 39 (N.D. 1984). The court explained
that the "prudent operator" standard is to be used after a lessor has given the lessee notice of the
alleged breach and made a satisfactory demand for compliance upon the lessee, and the lessee has not
complied with the demand within a reasonable time. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 788 (citing Olson, 345
N.W.2d at 40). The lessor must then bring judicial action against the lessee, wherein the lessee's
actions will be judged by the "prudent operator" standard to decide whether the lessee has breached
the implied covenant. Id. (citing Johnson, 392 N.W.2d at 58). Since the Ridls had not made a proper
demand for compliance upon EP, the court did not examine EP's actions associated with the implied
covenant of reasonable development to see if these actions measured up to the "prudent operator"
standard. Id.
89. Id. at 788-89. Furthermore, the court noted that the Ridls had not conformed to the specific
notice clause set forth in their lease. Id. at 789. This clause provided that the Ridls were required to
notify EP in writing of a breach of an express or implied obligation. Id. The notice was to serve as a
condition precedent to a lawsuit by the Ridls against EP. Id. The notice clause in the lease stated the
following:
'[iun the event Lessor considers that Lessee has failed to comply with any obligation hereunder, express or implied, Lessor shall notify Lessee in writing specifying in what
respects Lessor claims Lessee has breached this lease. The service of such notice and
lapse of sixty days without Lessee's meeting or commencing to meet the alleged
breaches shall be a condition precedent to any action by Lessor for any cause.'
Id. at 789 n.6. As such, the court concluded that the Ridls had failed to make an appropriate demand
to EP for compliance with the covenant of reasonable development. Id. at 789.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 788.
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met when EP's predecessor drilled a well on the leased land in 1981.92
Thus, the court held that this letter could not qualify as sufficient notice
as to the breach of the implied covenant of reasonable development that
93
the Ridls were alleging in the current case.
Second, the Ridls argued that notice and implied demand was given
by their attorney's May 25, 1995 letter to EP soliciting release of the
lease, which was accompanied by a notice of termination. 9 4 Since EP
received the notice of termination at the same instance as the demand,
the court reasoned that EP could not have reasonably been expected to
have subsequently developed the property. 9 5 Therefore, the court ruled
that the letter from the Ridls' attorney did not qualify as a sufficient
96
demand to comply with the covenant of reasonable development.
Third, the Ridls asserted that their complaint qualified as a demand for
compliance with the covenant of reasonable development. 97 However,
the court reasoned that a lessor could not reasonably expect a lessee to
develop the leased land after legal action has been instituted against the
lessee. 9 8 Thus, the court said that the demand requirement was not met
by the Ridls' complaint. 9 9 For these reasons, the court held that the
Ridls failed to give requisite notice and demand to EP.100
92. Id. Further, the court reasoned that when the Ridls ratified the 1973 lease, any consequence
of Moore's letter would have ended. Id. The trial court determined that Moore's letter was
immaterial after the 1973 lease was ratified and adopted in 1981. Appendix of Appellee at 75-76, Ridl
(No. 960032).
93. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 788.
94. Id.; see Brief of Appellant at 15, Ridl (No. 960032). But see Brief of Appellee at 18, Ridl
(No. 960032) (arguing that Ridls' correspondence constituted a demand for a release, not a demand
for development).
95. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 788. Additionally, the court found that the letter impliedly cautioned
against further development of the leased premises. Id.
96. Id.
97. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 788.
98. Id. at 788-89. As with the Ridls' attorney's letter, the court stated that the complaint impliedly
cautioned EP against further development of the leased premises. Id. at 788.
99. Id. at 788.
100. Id. at 789. Alternatively, Ridl did not solve the mystery of whether North Dakota recognizes the implied covenant of further development. See id. at 786-89. The case did not have an impact on clarifying the distinction between the covenant of reasonable development as an independent
covenant, separate and distinct from the implied covenant of reasonable development, whether further
exploration is simply a component merged into the implied covenant of reasonable development, or
whether the implied covenant of further exploration is to be recognized at all. Id. at 786, 788; see also
5 WILLIAMS, supra note 62, § 845, at 334. If anything, Ridl serves to further confuse the two covenants
since the court used the phrases "further develop" and "reasonable development" interchangeably.
Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 786, 788.
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Justice Meschke respectfully dissented from the majority, whose
opinion he referred to as a "gutting of [Section 47-16-36]."101 Asserting that the majority's decision robbed lessors of "an important tool
that encourages development," Justice Meschke compared the damaging
effect of the majority's decision to "sarcopenia," the affliction by
which aging persons lose skeletal muscle. 102 Justice Meschke argued
that this decision is a "form of legal sarcopenia-a loss of legal muscle
for mineral owners in the oil fields."103
Quoting the court's decision in Taurus, Justice Meschke argued that
Section 47-16-36 North Dakota Century Code was meant to establish an
uncomplicated way in which property owners could clear their titles
without going to court. 104 Justice Meschke claimed that the majority was
ignoring the "plain direction" of the statute by affirming the district
court's interpretation of Section 47-16-36.105 Justice Meschke reasoned
that the majority's interpretation, that forfeiture does not automatically
result from a lessee's failure to timely respond, rendered Section
47-36-36 useless.106
In addition, Justice Meschke argued that Taurus, which provided for
automatic forfeiture after the twenty day waiting period, should be
followed because this was the standard way in which lessors and lessees
in the oil and gas industry conduct business with each other.107 Justice
Meschke claimed that, because the majority declined to follow Taurus,
the Ridl opinion "makes a critical and drastic change in a well10 8
established relationship between oil and gas lessors in this state."
101. Id. at 792 (Meschke, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 789.
103. Id. at 789-90; see also Reiss v. Rummel, 232 N.W.2d 40, 43 (N.D. 1975) (discussing how the
Legislature is concerned with protecting landowners who were "actively solicited" by "shrewd
entrepreneurs" to lease their mineral rights).
104. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 791.
105. Id. Justice Meschke also noted that the court should not consider the "wisdom" of Section
47-16-36 since that is a function of the Legislature. Id.
106. Id. at 790. Justice Meschke pointed out that if a lease is canceled in court, there is no
reason to use the statute. Id. Consequently, he argued that the statute needs to be interpreted to apply
to leases where the forfeiture is in dispute. Id.
107. Id. (citing Taurus Corp. v. Roman York Equity Pure Trust, 264 N.W.2d 688, 689 (N.D.
1978)).
108. Id. To illustrate this point, Justice Meschke discussed an earlier case in which the court had
acknowledged the appropriateness of using Section 47-16-36 to cancel a lease. Id. (citing Johnson v.
Hamill, 392 N.W.2d 55, 56 (N.D. 1986)). In Johnson, a case involving an alleged breach of an
implied covenant of further development, the lessors sent a Section 47-16-36 notice to the lessee that
alleged the lease had terminated. 392 N.W.2d at 56. The lessee replied in conformity with the statute
so the lessor was then required to commence legal action in order to have the lease terminated. Id.
Justice Meschke emphasized the fact that the court's decision in that case was in favor of the lessee.
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While the majority claimed that the statute resulted in an automatic forfeiture of the lease, Justice Meschke argued that forfeiture is not automatic because a judicial determination can be made if the lessee disputes
the termination of the lease by notifying the Register of Deeds within the
statutory time period.' 0 9
Justice Meschke reiterated the idea from Taurus that if the statute
resulted in automatic forfeiture, there would still be a remedy to protect
against "unconscionable results.""l 0 He pointed out that there is another statute, Section 32-17-13 of the North Dakota Century Code,
which allows a party against whom default has been rendered to present
his or her case when such an action appears equitable. Ill Justice
Meschke further noted that Section 47-16-36 does not contain any restrictive language to indicate that it specifically applies to undisputed
forfeitures, and as such, it should be read to apply when the lease has
terminated for any reason.1 12
IV. IMPACT
Ridl marks a "critical and drastic change in a well-established
relationship between oil and gas lessors and lessees in this state." 1l3
Relying on Taurus, parties in the oil and gas industry in North Dakota
have been using the process set forth in Section 47-16-36 to terminate

leases based on a lessor's allegation of the lessee's breach of an implied
covenant. 114 As Justice Meschke noted, the Taurus interpretation of
Section 47-16-36 served as a means for lessors to quickly and easily
clear a title that was allegedly in dispute." 15
According to an oil and gas law practitioner, by "refus[ing] to
recognize . . . [Section] 47-16-36 in cases where there has been [a]
breach of an implied covenant ...[the court in Ridl has] significantly
Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 791. Using the rationale of Johnson, Justice Meschke stated that the only thing EP
would have had to do in order to dispute the cancellation was to simply answer the Ridls' notice within
the 20 day time limit. Id.
109. Id.at 790. Justice Meschke also disagreed with the majority's decision that cancellation of a
lease because of breach of the implied covenant to develop can only be obtained by suing the party in
court. Id.at 791. He argued that going to court is a remedy available for a lessee who disputes that
there has been a breach of the covenant. Id.at 790.
110. Id.(citing Taurus Corp., 264 N.W.2d at 693 (Pederson, J., concurring)).
111. Id.(citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-17-13 (Supp. 1997)).
112. Id. at 791. Justice Meschke noted that Section 47-16-36 states that it pertains to leases
where forfeiture is in controversy. Id. Thusustice Meschke concluded that the statute should apply
to a forfeiture issuing from a breach of an implied covenant as in this case. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.at 787.
115. Id.;
see also Maus, supra note 65 (stating that Section 47-16-36 "had been used for many
years to remove from the record oil and gas leases without a judicial determination").
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shift[ed] to the mineral owner the expensive burden of litigation in cases
where [litigation] might not otherwise [be] required."11 6 As a result, the
practitioner predicted that a larger number of "oil and gas leases [will
be] 'warehoused' because the lessor no longer has an inexpensive
7
remedy" for a lessee's failure to develop leased lands."l
Despite its departure from Taurus, the court in Ridl reasoned that it
was creating a just way of dealing with terminations of implied covenants
because a lessor must now have something more than just a loophole to
get a lease canceled.l18 The court recognized the lessee's investment in
a lease and managed to protect this by eliminating a potential ambush
upon a lessee who may not receive notice within the twenty day limit or
may not be able to respond within that time frame."19 Since the court
protected against automatic forfeiture, it appears to intend to bring about
more equitable results in the oil and gas industry than had previously
occurred in the years prior to Ridl.120
After Ridl, an oil and gas lessor who disputes the validity of his or
her lease due to the lessor's breach of an implied covenant must follow
several steps.121 First, the lessor must give the lessee proper notice of termination due to the alleged breach and the facts and circumstances
giving rise to this claim.12 2 Second, the lessor must also provide the
116. Maus, supra note 65.
117. Id.
118. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 787. But see N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-37 (Supp. 1997) (providing that
a lessor may recover costs and attorney's fees incurred in seeking a release of a lease); cf. Maus,
supra note 65 (reasoning that fewer lessors will dispute lessees who are retaining undeveloped
portions of land because of the cost of litigation)..
119. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 787. EP did not receive notice within the 20 days allotted to it because
the Ridls' attorney had sent the notice to the wrong address, causing it to go through many departments
before it reached the correct destination. Brief of Appellee at 34, Ridl (No. 960032). By the time the
correspondence reached the correct destination, the statutory period had expired. Id.
120. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 787-88. But cf. Maus, supra note 65 (discussing that Ridl creates a
"strong disincentive to development"). One concern the court did not explicitly address is whether the
Ridl interpretation will be applied retroactively or prospectively, although it is assumed that it will be
applied prospectively. See generally Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 785. Clearly, the question of whether the
decision should be applied proactively or retroactively would be of great consequence to mineral
owners and oil and gas companies that lease the mineral owners' interests. See Malloy v. Boettcher,
334 N.W.2d 8, 8-9 (N.D. 1983). In Malloy, the court applied its ruling on a real property deed
retroactively. Id. As a result, years of deeds with reservations were prepared incorrectly. Id. But cf
N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-10 (1987) (stating that "[n]o part of this code is retroactive unless it is
expressly declared to be so"); Slaaten v. Amerada Hess Corp., 459 N.W.2d 765, 766-67 (N.D. 1990)
(citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-09.8 (1987) (stating that Section 38-08-09.8 of the North Dakota
Century Code, amended in 1983, which shortened the length of time in which a lease can be held by
production due to unitization, shall not be applied retroactively to a portion of land unitized in the
1960s)).
121. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 787-88.
122. Id. at 788; see Olson, 345 N.W.2d at 40.
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lessee with a demand that the covenant be complied with.1 2 3 According
24
to the statute, the lessor can include a release for the lessor to sign.1 If
this release is not signed by the lessor, or if the Register of Deeds of the
county in which the land is located does not receive a letter stating that
the lease is still in effect, the lessor can record a Satisfaction of Oil and
Gas Lease.t 25 However, the lessee must be given a reasonable amount of
time to comply with the demand. 126 If the demand is not complied with
within a reasonable amount of time, the lessee can take the lessor to court
to get a judicial determination of termination.1 27
Nevertheless, even after Ridl, a lessee should not-ignore a notice of
termination should one be received. 12 8 Ridl only specifically addressed
the situation of a breach of an implied covenant of reasonable development and did not discuss how the statute would apply in other fact
scenarios, such as in the case of an alleged breach of an express term of
a lease. 129 Since this uncertainty exists, a lessee should still file a reply to
any notice of termination within the twenty day statutory period, despite
the lessor's stated reasons for the notice of termination. 130
V.

CONCLUSION

In Ridl, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a lessee's
interest in a lease is not terminated when it neglects to reply within
twenty days of a notice of termination due to a breach of an implied
covenant; and that termination of a lease requires a suitable demand and
123. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 788; see Olson, 345 N.W.2d at 39. In order to qualify as an appropriate
demand, it must be a clear, not implied, demand that the terms of the covenant be complied with. Ridl,
553 N.W.2d at 788-89. This demand cannot be served with a complaint, nor can the lessor assert that
a complaint constitutes notice and demand. Id. at 788.
124. N.D. CENT. CODE Section 47-16-36 (Supp. 1997).
125. Id. However, the lessee's interest would not be terminated at that time. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at
787-88. Instead, only record evidence of the lessee's interest in the lease would be lost. Id. at 787.
126. Id. at 789.
127. Id. at 787-88.
128. Supreme Court Reverses PriorHolding Regarding Lease Termination Statute, MINERAL LAW
NEWSLETTER, (Fleck, Mather, & Strutz, Ltd., Bismarck, N.D.), Oct. 1996, at 4 [hereinafter Lease
Termination];see also Letter from John L. Sherman, Attorney at. Mackoff, Kellogg, Kirby & Kloster,
P.C., Dickinson, N.D. (Oct. 23, 1997) (on file with author) (reasoning that § 47-16-36 is "a
prerequisite to commencement of an action to terminate a lease in cases where a dispute exists as to
whether or not the lease is valid").
129. Lease Termination, supra note 128, at 4. Moreover, it is not certain if Ridl would apply in a
Taurus situation, where there has been a failure of consideration. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 787. But cf.
Maus, supra note 65 (discussing that Ridl has "render[ed] the statute useless").
130. Lease Termination, supra note 128, at 4.
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a failure to further develop within a reasonable time. 13 1 In order to clear
up the uncertainty left after Ridl, the court or the Legislature should
clarify the specific situations to which this holding applies. If the court
intends for Section 47-16-36 to be used to produce automatic forfeiture
for breaches of express obligations of a lease, this should be declared so
that lessors and lessees alike will know their rights and duties under the
law. 132
13
Leah Kelley Kopseng

3

131. Ridl, 553 N.W.2d at 785-86.
132. Additionally, the court or the Legislature should clearly state whether North Dakota recognizes the implied covenant of further exploration. See supra notes 62, 100. If North Dakota chooses
to recognize this covenant, it should be specified how this covenant differs from the implied covenant
of reasonable development so that parties to a lease will be aware of their rights and obligations. See
supra notes 62, 100.
133. I would like to acknowledge the following people for their comments, suggestions and guidance on this article: Lawrence Bender, Shane A. Hanson, Michael J. Maus, John L. Sherman, Craig
C. Smith, and Nancy Strantz. Also, thank you to my fiancd and my parents, for their patience during
the writing of this article and their constant love and support.

